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Cardinal Newman and Jury Verdicts:
Reason, Belief, and Certitude
Colin Moran*
The reconciliation of faith and reason was the dominant concern of
John Henry Cardinal Newman's intellectual life. His fifteen "Univer-
sity Sermons" show him wrestling with the subject throughout his
twenty years as an Anglican cleric.1 In An Essay in Aid of a
Grammar of Assent, written after his conversion to Roman
Catholicism, Newman forged his thought on the subject into a more
coherent whole
Newman insisted that the human ratiocinative faculty depends, to
a greater degree than was at the time appreciated, on assumptions
and inferences which cannot be put into words. Rationality, in his
view, was "any process or act of the mind, by which, from knowing
one thing, [the mind] advances on to know another."3 This definition
of rationality positioned him to argue that certainty in religious belief
was as "reasonable" as many of the non-religious beliefs accepted
with certainty by every normal mind in the course of everyday life.
Newman sought to show that as in non-religious matters, so in
Christian faith, a person may reasonably believe propositions she
cannot prove to be true.
Judicial finders of fact also reach definite conclusions on the basis
of incomplete proof. Every juror at a criminal trial, like every
religious inquirer, must decide on a proposition without verifying the
* Second year J.D. candidate, Stanford Law School. This Article was written at Keble
College, Oxford University, during a year-long stay funded by the British government's
Chevening Fellowship. My thanks to the Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., who suggested the
analogy between Newman's thinking and the law. Adrian Zuckerman of University College,
Oxford, and Peter Hinchliff of Christ Church College, Oxford, offered suggestions as helpful as
they were generous. Finally, the sensitive and surgical editing of Michael Adler and the rest of
the edit team at the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities significantly improved the piece.
1. JOHN H. NEWMAN, FIFTEEN SERMONS PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERsrry OF OXFORD
(London, Abingden Press 1872) [hereinafter UNIVERSITY SERMONS].
2. JOHN H. NEWMAN, AN ESSAY IN AiD OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT (Ian T. Ker ed., 1985)
(1870) [hereinafter GRAMMAR OF ASSENT].3. UNIVERSITY SERMONS, supra note 1, at xi.
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conclusion empirically or proving it though explicit logic. Both the
religious inquirer of Newman's conception and the juror are forced to
reason by probability, which implies qualification and reservation.
Yet Newman insists that one may believe religious truth with
certitude, and the law presupposes that a juror can reach a conclusion
"beyond reasonable doubt."
Observe the similarity between Newman's description of the
evidentiary basis of faith and Maine Chief Justice Appleton's charge
to the jury in a nineteenth-century murder trial:
Newman: We are so constituted, that if we insist upon being as
sure as is conceivable, in every step of our course, we must be
content to creep along the ground, and can never soar. If we are
intended for great ends, we are called to great hazards; and,
whereas we are given absolute certainty in nothing, we must in
all things choose between doubt and inactivity.4
Chief Justice Appleton: The possibility of error exists whether the
evidence be direct or circumstantial. But because you possibly
may err, do you refuse to act? Because your wheat may possibly
be blighted, do you refuse to sow? Until it pleases Providence
to give us means of knowledge beyond our present faculties we
must act upon this kind of evidence or grant almost universal
impunity to crime.5
To defend his view that religious belief was reasonable, Newman
developed an elaborate model of the human reasoning process. In his
conception, human reasoning proceeds in patterns which are suf-
ficiently distinct and repetitive to be stated as laws.6 He holds his
model of reasoning out as a description of the way in which minds
reach conclusions in all types of inquiry. Religious belief is
reasonable, in his view, because it conforms to those general patterns.
This Article explores the analogy between Newman's model of the
human reasoning process and the mode of proof in criminal trials.
The comparison has two purposes. First, Newman's description of the
process of human reason illustrates the mental process by which jurors
reach conclusions. Second, analogy from Newman's model of human
reason to the way in which jurors reach conclusions permits a "test
case" of whether Newman's model accurately describes general
patterns of human reasoning.
4. Id. at 215.
5. The Reed Murder Trial, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER, Mar. 30, 1874, at 1.
6. Cf. 19 LETmERS AND DIARIEs OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 114 (Charles S. Dessain ed.,
1961) [hereinafter LETTERS AND DIARIES]("Tie laws of the human mind.., command and
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The first Section of this Article briefly sketches the historical
context in which Newman wrote. The second Section presents a
similarly brief summary of the basic arguments of the Grammar of
Assent. The third Section compares Newman's description of reason
and certitude to those same concepts as they are defined through
selected criminal rules of evidence. Within this third Section, I
observe the basic similarity between Newman's concept of certitude
and the standard of proof in a criminal trial and use the analogy to
explore an ambiguity that is common to both: If one can be made
surer of a conclusion, does one have certainty?
The Article goes on to pose two questions about jury verdicts: (1)
Does the term "moral certainty" add anything to the meaning of the
term "beyond reasonable doubt"? and (2) Why does the law not
require juries to articulate the evidentiary basis for their decisions?
Newman's model of human reasoning suggests original answers to
each of those questions.
Next, the Article raises two questions about Newman's argument:
(1) Is Newman right that a person can reasonably have absolute
certitude in a proposition even though each piece of evidence, viewed
individually, is inconclusive? and (2) Is Newman right that a person
can have absolute certitude when the sum of evidence, viewed as a
corroborated whole, still leaves room for doubt? The rules governing
proof in a criminal trial suggest that Newman's approach to the first
question is correct. However, with regard to the second question,
analogy to the mode of proof in criminal law exposes an elemental
flaw in Newman's reconciliation of faith and reason.
I. NEWMAN'S INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND
Unlike many intellectuals, Newman's impact depends as much on
who he was as what he said.7 Before elaborating his views on belief
and reason, however, it is worth pausing to observe several features
of Newman's life and intellectual background.' Born in 1801 to
middle class English parents, Newman was an undergraduate at
Oxford before becoming an Anglican cleric and fellow of Oriel
College. During more than twenty years at Oxford he delivered
sermons that mesmerized a generation of undergraduates. William
Gladstone, an undergraduate in 1831, said there had not "been
7. Cf. George W. Rutler, Newman and the Power of Personality, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
THE CENTENARY OF JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN: 1801-1890, at 111 (1989).
8. Two excellent recent biographies of Newman are SHERIDAN GILLEY, NEWMAN AND HIS
AGE (1990); IAN KER, JOHN HENRY NEWMAN: A BIOGRAPHY (1988).
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anything like his influence [over a university] . .. since Abelard
lectured in Paris." 9
Newman came to intellectual maturity during an age of intense
confusion for religious believers. By the early nineteenth century,
new techniques of Biblical commentary and criticism, widespread
social challenges to traditional sources of political and ecclesiastical
authority, advances in science, and sophisticated new forms of
philosophical agnosticism were leaving believers in traditional
Christian faith bewildered and uncertain as to the intellectual
defensibility of religious belief.1°
Newman was particularly conscious of the impact of scientific and
philosophical developments on religious belief. Scientific inves-
tigation, as catalogued by Francis Bacon, depended on empirical
observation and logical induction. A reasonable inquirer could test
and disprove hypotheses as to scientific truth. If a proposition could
not submit to this kind of investigation, the candid mind would
classify it as uncertain." This scientific skepticism was mirrored in
the work of philosophical skeptics like David Hume, who contended
that all knowledge derives from sensory impression. Since no person
could verify God's presence empirically through sensory impression,
his work suggested that belief in God was not intellectually defen-
sible.12
Newman agreed with Hume that rational reflection on the natural
world would not lead inescapably to one metaphysical conclusion.'
3
But, unlike other Christian apologists who responded to Hume's
philosophical skepticism, Newman's adherence to traditional Christian
orthodoxy was unquestionable. This combination of orthodoxy and
sensitivity to modem currents of thought partially explains his
credibility as a modem Christian apologist. It also describes
Newman's intellectual dilemma. Caught between orthodoxy and
skepticism, Newman felt "the intellectual pressures of the age as a
kind of agony."' 4 His attempt to reconcile faith and reason may be
9. GILLEY, supra note 8, at 125.
10. DAVID A. PAILIN, THE WAY TO FAITH: AN EXAMINATION OF NEWMAN'S GRAMMAR
OF ASSENT AS A RESPONSE TO THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY IN FAITH 6 (1969).
11. See Barbara Shapiro, Law and Science in Seventeenth Century England, 21 STAN. L. REV.
729, 749-52 (1969).
12. See PALIN, supra note 10, at 7. One nineteenth-century Christian thinker who tried to
incorporate the insights of Hume while nonetheless carving out a basis for Christian belief was
Friedrich Schleiermacher. He sought to preempt the argument that humans could not have
objective knowledge of God by relocating religious belief from the area of knowledge to
"feeling" or "self-consciousness." The difficulty with efforts such as his was that they seemed
to reinterpret not only the basis for Christian belief but the substance of the belief itself. See
PAILIN, supra note 10, at 11.
13. JAMES CAMERON, Newman and Empiricism, in THE NIGHT BATTLE 219, 236 (1962).
14. JAMES CAMERON, The Logic of the Heart, in CAMERON, supra note 13, at 203, 207.
[Vol. 8: 63
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seen as an effort to quiet the tension between his own soul and mind.
The fact that he returned to the question of faith and reason so
persistently throughout his life suggests that he needed to know why,
and perhaps even if, he could be so certain.
Deeply personal as this struggle was, however, Newman's problem
was the religious difficulty of his age and, some would say, of ours.1 5
Preternaturally sensitive to the direction in which ideas were moving,
he met the powerful new views confronting Christianity not by
constructing a philosophical system of thought but by drawing a
tentative blueprint for reasonable religious belief. The recurrent
theme of his approach was that no certitude, religious or
non-religious, could arise from logic alone. Though he conceded that
formal logic contributed to certitude, he insisted upon the existence
of inarticulable elements of belief as well. His model of human
reasoning, which I now summarize, portrays the intellect enmeshed
with the mysterious and inarticulable depths of the human soul.
II. SUMMARY OF GRAMMAR OF ASSENT
Grammar of Assent begins abruptly, without introduction or
statement of purpose. Newman's exact objective has to be gathered
as one reads. The notes of a conversation between Newman and a
contemporary, however, explain that Newman's central goal was to
show that one may believe, first, what one does not fully understand
and, second, what one cannot demonstrate to be true. 6 It is with
the second of these arguments that this Article is concerned.
I summarize Newman's argument by defining its key concepts and
illustrating them with examples. While his argument is not entirely
satisfying in various respects, I defer criticism of it until the final
section of this Article.
A. Assent is Unconditional Acceptance of a Proposition7
Newman begins his Grammar of Asent by explaining what it
means to assent to a proposition. One may approach a proposition
in one of three ways: interrogatively, conditionally, or categorically.
The interrogative is simply a question-e.g., should one vote for the
Tories? If one approaches a proposition conditionally, one is
expressing one's agreement with it only to the extent that some other
proposition is true-e.g., one should vote for the Tories if their
15. Cf. IAN T. KER, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 71-73 (1990) (arguing
that Newman anticipated Wittgenstein's "radical critique of skeptical empiricism").
16. 2 JOHN H. NEWMAN, PHILOSOPHICAL NOTEBOOK OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 153
(Edward Sillem ed., 1969).
17. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 157-88.
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leadership is sound. One who has a categorical attitude to a
proposition has dispensed with reservations and simply agrees-e.g.,
one should vote for the Tories. Each of these three explicit attitudes
toward a proposition corresponds with an inner attitude. One may be
doubtful towards a proposition, one may accept it inferentially (i.e.,
conditionally), or one may assent to it. Consider three people, each
of whom deposits money in the a bank and is then told that she may
recover her entire deposit at will. The first has never before used a
bank and thinks to herself, "What a fool I am; my money may be as
good as gone." The second person has had difficulties with banks
before and thinks to herself, "Aye, so long as you clerks do not botch
the matter." The last person is a sophisticated financier and conceives
the statement to be a self-evident courtesy, equivalent to the
assurance, "We're always ready to help you, sir." The first doubts,
the second infers, and the third assents. The crucial characteristic of
assent is that one has no doubt of the proposition in question.
B. Inference Is Conditional Acceptance of a Proposition18
The chief distinction between inference and assent is that one who
assents has proceeded so far in her assurance of a proposition that she
takes its truth as settled and not dependent on other propositions.
Assent is unconditional; inference is conditional. Anytime one says
she believes x because of y, she describes an act of inference.
Newman further distinguishes between formal and informal
inference. Formal inference is an act of reason which can be put
easily into words. The most obvious example is the logical syllogism.
Informal inference refers to reasoning which is not converted easily
into words-the ways in which one makes the various large and small
decisions and assumptions which permit the mind's reasoning process
to advance. The dismissal of ridiculous propositions, the judgment
that one of two inconsistent stories seems more plausible than
another, and the ability to find an ordering principle amidst a tangle
of confused facts, are all mental operations that the reasoner may
execute simultaneously without the ability to perceive or recall
separately.
In Newman's metaphor, a practiced eye may note the faces of two
people thirty years apart in age and, without more information,
discern that they are members of the same family.19 If asked, the
observer might not be able to articulate the common characteristics
18. Id. at 259-330. My summary of informal inference omits the important, related concept
of the "illative sense" but does not simplify Newman's argument in any respect relevant to the
discussion in this Article.
19. Id. at 190.
[Vol. 8: 63
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which gave rise to the inference of familial relationship. In Newman's
emphasis on the inarticulability of much of the reasoning process, we
see one of his great advances beyond stale, nineteenth-century
rationalism. He was among the first to insist that the complexity of
the mind's processes passed beyond the reach of descriptive words.
The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances
forward with a quickness which has become a proverb and a
subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on
from point to point, gaining one by some indication, another on
a probability, then availing itself of an association; then falling
back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then
committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward
instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not
unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt
hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by
personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule,
leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another ....
And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted,
commonly reason, not by rule, but by an inward faculty.20
Informal inference differs from formal inference in function. Acts
of formal inference operate most effectively upon abstractions. The
act of abstraction makes the inference easier to express with words,
but necessarily less descriptive of any concrete thing. Take the
following example: "Robert is manic. Manic people are treatable by
lithium. Robert is treatable by lithium." The premise of this
syllogism, that Robert is manic, cannot be proved by deductive logic
or any other type of formal inference. In point of fact, he may be
manic or he may be simply excitable and not need lithium.
A psychiatrist of long experience diagnoses him as manic and in
immediate need of lithium. A second psychiatrist, fresh from medical
school, finds him to be "brimming with positive energy." The
younger doctor makes a more articulate case for his diagnosis than
the older doctor, who says only that Robert seems like other manic
patients he has treated. The older doctor's aura of competence, the
younger doctor's corresponding aura of hastiness, and the parents'
own sense that Robert indeed had some sort of serious problem all
lead Robert's parents to the ultimate conclusion. They are certain
that the older doctor is right and they proceed with the lithium
treatment. Thus, through formal inference, the parents learned that
the medical treatment for manic depression is lithium. But it was
only through informal inference that they concluded the general
20. UNIVERSITY SERMONS, supra note 1, at 255-57.
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medical rule applied to their son. The cumulation of probabilities so
fit together, each corroborating another, that the parents arrived at an
assent which was the result of "converging probabilities, a cumulative
proof.
21
C. "Antecedent Probability" Refers to the Influence of Premises on
Reasoning22
Newman's concept of "antecedent probability" describes ideas
which are related such that the truth of one enhances the probability
of the truth of the other. He understood this both as a principle of
inductive logic and as a realistic description of human psychology. As
a matter of inductive logic, his point was that if x and y are related
such that the truth of x enhances the likelihood that y is true, the
truth of x creates an antecedent probability for the truth of y. Thus,
someone who believes in the existence of God would attach more
weight to evidence of divine miracles than an atheist.
Newman added a penetrating psychological twist to this principle
of inductive logic. As applied in the religious context, the important
antecedent assumptions derive from character traits. Someone who
values selflessness is more disposed to believe in the resurrection of
a person who taught the giving of all possessions to the poor than is
someone who affirms hedonism as a first principle. The principle of
antecedent probability, thus understood, explains. why an uneducated
person could reasonably accept a religious truth which a sophisticated
philosopher might nevertheless not find rational.
Given the inarticulable nature of informal inference, it would be
difficult to measure the exact influence personal characteristics exert
on a person's evaluation of evidence. However, even if the influence
were measurable, one would not be much closer to achieving a single
probabilistic value for the relevant evidence. The measurement would
only expose different antecedent assumptions. Newman wrote:
Half the controversies in the world are verbal ones; and could
they be brought to a plain issue, they would be brought to a
prompt termination. Parties engaged in them would then
perceive, either that in substance they agreed together, or that
their difference was one of first principles . . . . We need not
dispute, we need not prove,-we need but define . ... When
men understand each other's meaning, they see, for the most
part, that controversy is either superfluous or hopeless. 3
21. 15 LETrERs AND DIAREs, supra note 6, at 457.
22. See GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 183, 194, 213, 245-47, 272-74, 276, 283, 375,
388.
23. UNIVERSrrY SERMONS, supra note 1, at 177.
[Vol. 8: 63
8
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol8/iss1/4
Moran
For Newman, the point too easily forgotten in debate over religion
was that some antecedent assumptions could not be resolved by
reason. In such a situation, Newman argued that two people could
attach different probabilistic values to the same evidence though both
might be reasoning correctly.
D. Certitude Is Unconditional Belief for Which One Cannot State
the Complete Evidentiary Support2 4
In defining certitude, Newman tied together his entire argument.
Certitude is a type of assent, but it describes only those types of
assents which one has self-consciously evaluated. If such self-scrutiny
does not reveal some conditionality in one's attitude to the
proposition, one has certitude. One who merely assents without
reflection has no thought of any doubt but might find one if she
examined her assent closely. In contrast, someone who has certitude
cannot be made any more sure of the proposition. In Newman's
example, a person who has certitude that India exists cannot be made
more certain of its existence by personally visiting it.
A second feature of certitude is that the level of probability
required having it varies from person to person. One person may
have certitude that India exists because she has read about it in a
book. Another person may read the book and not believe its
existence with certitude until a close acquaintance has visited the
place and returned to tell about it.
Finally, and most importantly, no one can ever articulate the
complete evidentiary basis for her certitude. This is so for two
reasons. First, the process of reasoning that leads to this certainty
begins with antecedent assumptions, which do not admit of proof or
disproof Second, one arrives at it through informal inferences, which
are inarticulable.
Newman believes that these characteristics describe all certitudes,
whether they pertain to religious or non-religious subjects. It is
therefore unreasonable to expect a believer to accumulate any
particular level of proof for her belief, to weigh evidence in the same
way as a non-believer, or to state the grounds on which her certitude
rests. Since certitude as to non-religious propositions does not require
any of these characteristics, goes his argument, neither does certitude
as to religious belief. The difference between religious and secular
certitudes is subject matter, not intellectual defensibility.
24. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 138-68.
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III. ANALOGY BETWEEN NEWMAN'S THEORY OF BELIEF AND
THE MODE OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
This third Section compares Newman's description of reason and
certitude to those same concepts as they are defined through selected
criminal rules of evidence. The comparison is designed to illuminate
both Newman's thought and the law. In the first Subsection, I
observe the basic similarity between the two and use the analogy to
argue that judicial conclusions of fact admit of degree.
In the second Subsection, I use Newman's model to cast light on
the mental processes. by which juries reach conclusions. First, I argue
that the term "moral certainty" should be understood as permitting
jurors to base decisions to convict or acquit on personal value
judgments. Second, I suggest that Newman's distinction between
formal and informal inference explicates the judicial division of labor
between judge and jury, and in particular explains why juries do not
justify their verdict with a written opinion.
In the third Subsection, I use the law to evaluate Newman's
argument that reason in religious matters proceeds according to the
same rules as reason in non-religious matters. While analogy to the
law bolsters parts of Newman's argument, it also illuminates an
important distinction between the evidentiary basis of religious belief
and that of non-religious belief.
A. Scrutiny of Newman's Concept of Certitude Undermines New-
man's Position and Legal Commentary That Suggests That
Certitude Does Not Admit of Degree
1. The Historical Origins of Legal Standards of Proof Reveal Am-
bivalence as to the Level of Assurance One Can Reach with
Probabilistic Reasoning
The historical origins of modem legal standards of proof emphasize
the analogy between Newman and the law in two ways. First,
seventeenth-century legal commentary on the subject of proof and
certainty reveals the extent to which legal and religious discourse once
consciously shared a common terminology. Second, legal standards
of proof presuppose reasoning by probability but ambivalence as to
whether conclusions so reached could be held unconditionally. This
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Two of the most authoritative legal and religious voices of the
seventeenth century were Sir Matthew Hale and Samuel Pufendorf.25
In debating the truthfulness of the New Testament, Hale focused on
the reliability of witnesses, using criteria and terminology transferred
directly from the law. One could judge the truthfulness of the
Gospels by
the veracity of him that reports and relates it. And hence it is,
that that which is reported by many Eye-witnesses hath greater
motives of credibility than that which is reported by few; that
which is reported by credible and authentic witnesses, than that
which is reported by light and inconsiderable witnesses; that
which is reported by a person disinterested, than that which is
reported by persons whose interest is to have the thing true, or
believed to be true ... that which is reported by credible persons
of their own view, than that which they receive by hear-say from
those that report on their own view.26
Pufendorf's work explicitly linked moral theology and the law. He
argued that morals could be made into a science, the conclusions of
which could be just as certain as the conclusions of mathematics and
philosophy. Interestingly, Pufendorf employed the modern ter-
minology of the law to describe the conscience. As Pufendorf saw it,
the individual searching his conscience and the juror searching the
evidence could both apply disinterested reason to arrive at conclusions
with certainty. When the conscience saw "no reason to doubt," it
could arrive at conclusions "true and certain"; likewise, the juror who
evaluated evidence with sufficient care could vote with a "satisfied
conscience.""
Seventeenth-century thought distinguished between knowledge and
probability. One could have "absolute certainty" of a conclusion if it
could be empirically verified, or proven like a geometric theorem.
Propositions which could not be verified through sensory observation
or logically proved would be affirmed or rejected on the basis of
probabilistic judgments. About this kind of proposition, one could
have "moral certainty" but not "absolute certainty."
But how reliable was moral certainty? In his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, John Locke had cautioned that the one
"unerring mark" of a love of truth was "the not entertaining any
25. Barbara Shapiro, To a "Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American
Juries 1600-1850, 38 HAST. L.J. 161, 167 (1986).
. 26. MATTHEW HALE, THE PRIMITIVE ORGANIZATION OF MANKIND 128 (1677), quoted in
Shapiro, supra note 25, at 162.
27. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 11, 17-18 (B. Kennet &
W. Percivale trans., 1703), quoted in Shapiro, supra note 25, at 167.
1996]
11
Moran: Cardinal Newman and Jury Verdicts
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1996
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
propositions with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will
warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent.., loves no
truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end."'  Nonetheless,
after setting strict proportionality of evidence to assurance as his
standard, Locke went on to speak of "probabilities that rise so near
to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and
influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident
demonstration. 2 9
The idea is that after a certain mass of evidence builds up in favor
of a proposition, the mind ceases to distinguish between high levels
of probability and absolute certainty. Newman, as we shall see later,
builds much of his case around this alleged tendency of the mind.
Neither Locke nor the excerpted jury instruction go far towards
explaining why the mind ceases to distinguish between high-level
probability and certainty. One explanation is that some conclusions
are supported by so much convincing evidence that the possibility of
error becomes as imperceptible as an unnoticed crack in a pane of
glass.
That explanation, however, glosses over the real disagreement
among writers at the time. Some, such as Pufendorf, viewed both
moral certainty and absolute certainty as equally reliable. The
difference between the terms was only in the mode of reasoning.
Others, like John Locke, insisted that all conclusions which could not
be sensorially verified or logically proved remained conditional. From
Locke's perspective, the difference in the mode of reasoning
necessarily implied a difference in the reliability of the conclusion. As
the following section will demonstrate, this disagreement reappears
within Newman's work as an ambivalence in his conception of
certitude.
The key point that illuminates both Newman's thinking and the law
is that conclusions on questions of non-verifiable fact imply inductive,
probabilistic reasoning. Logical demonstration alone could never
prove more than general statements because such logic depends on
abstractions. Since a jury exists precisely to make judgments of
concrete fact, its conclusions would always be made with moral rather
than absolute certainty.
28. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 428 (A.Z. Woozley ed.,
1964), quoted in GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 108.
29. i at 409-10, quoted in GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 107.
[Vol. 8: 63
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2. Newman's Concept of Certitude Reveals His Ambivalence
Between Practical Certainty and Absolute Certitude
Newman's distinction between conditional inference and uncon-
ditional certitude straddles a basic tension between faith and reason.
On the road to certitude, a person makes formal and informal
inferential conclusions. While no inquiry into a question of
non-verifiable fact can ever exclude all doubt, at some point so much
evidence accumulates that the human mind ceases to apportion
assurance to evidence. The mind simply rests in a state of certitude.
Since the mind is already certain, no additional evidence can make it
more certain. In Newman's example, a person who had seen India on
the map would not be made more certain of its existence by personal-
ly visiting it.3" Religious certitude, according to Newman, is simply
a version of this pattern of human reasoning. Though the evidence
for a religious proposition is not perfectly complete, one is still
reasonable to believe with certitude.
In an 1841 sermon, Newman described faith as "the absolute accep-
tance of a certain message or doctrine as divine; that is, it starts from
probabilities, yet it ends in peremptory statements., 31 Yet im-
mediately after the passage just cited, he wrote:
Though faith be a presumption of facts under defective
knowledge, yet, be it observed, it is altogether a practical
principle. It judges and decides because it cannot help doing so
.... It is the act of a mind feeling that it is its duty any how,
under its particular circumstances, to judge and to act, whether
its light be greater or less, and wishing to make the most of that
light and acting for the best. Its knowledge, then, though
defective, is not insufficient for the purpose for which it uses it,
for this plain reason, because ... it has no more.32
Newman was unable to resist describing faith in terms which
implied that it was an acting assumption rather than an absolute
certainty. Fifteen years before writing Grammar of Assent, Newman
referred to the view that belief was only a practical certainty, and
wrote privately, "[L]eft to myself, I should be very much tempted to
take [this position]., 33 However, he could not adopt this attitude,
apparently because it seemed so unstable a basis for religious faith:
"What! the object of worship, faith, and obedience all one's life long,
for which one acted.., day by day and through sorrow and joy, what
30. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 119.
31. UNIVERSITY SERMONS, supra note 1, at 298-99.
32. Id.
33. 15 LETrERS AND DIARIES, supra note 6, at 456.
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mind, if ever so little religious would say he only opined Its exis-
tence?"34
In this passage Newman communicates more perhaps than he
intended. Sympathetic readers may feel the poignancy of his dilemma
as they watch him slide back and forth between the two forms of
certainty. Unable to establish a rock-solid evidentiary basis for
absolute certitude, he was nonetheless unwilling to describe his
incandescent inner experience as a practical probability. Perhaps he
feared that tentativeness in assurance would lead the believer to relax
her efforts to achieve Christian sanctity.
In Grammar of Assent, therefore, the reader hears nothing of
anything called "practical certainty." The process of reasoning to find
religious faith is presented as a clean leap from conditional inference
to unconditional certitude, without a halfway stop for practical
certainty. Newman did not resolve the dilemma of early legal writers
who disputed whether certainty on questions of non-verifiable fact
was conditional or unconditional. Instead, the ambivalence in his
elucidation of certitude mirrored their disagreement.
3. The Criminal Law Standard of Proof Presupposes That There
Are Degrees of Certitude, in Contrast to Newman's View That It
Does Not
One of the few times that Newman made explicit analogy to the
rules of legal evidence was to support his point that certitude does not
admit of degree. Referring to the instruction in a contemporary legal
evidence treatise that required the fact-finder to "exclude a rational
probability of innocence" before voting guilty, Newman argued that
this degree of proof presupposed evidence "free from anything...
[which] would hinder that summation and coalescence of the evidence
into a proof, which I have compared to the running into a limit, in the
case of mathematical ratios."35
In this characterization of the criminal law standard of proof,
Newman might have found specific support in a recent treatise on the
principles of criminal law.36 In Adrian A.S. Zuckerman's view, the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is "the highest attainable
standard for the proof of guilt."37 By "highest attainable," Zucker-
man means not the highest assurance which can be attained without
witnessing the crime, but the highest assurance of which the mind is
capable, whether a person has seen the crime firsthand or not. "The
34. Id.
35. UNIVERSrrY SERMONS, supra note 2, at 210.
36. ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 134-41 (1989).
37. Id. at 134.
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highest attainable standard," he writes, "is one that so approximates
to certainty as to make no difference."3  One has to admit the
"theoretical possibility" of error, but insofar as a juror's evaluation of
the evidence is concerned, this possibility is "imperceptible."39 Every
juror who properly votes for a guilty verdict feels as certain of the
defendant's guilt as if she witnessed the accused perform the crime
firsthand.
This account of the highest legal standard of proof is difficult to
sustain. The central problem lies in its equation of "perceptible
doubt" with "reasonable doubt." Zuckerman understands a doubt to
be imperceptible when "we cannot assign it any probative value. '
This evades the whole difficulty. Almost any hypothesis has some
probative value. The question, therefore, is not when a doubt does
or does not have any probative value, but when its probative value
becomes so small that the particular juror in question deems it
inadequate to support a vote of innocence.
Zuckerman's own example is illustrative. He posits a defendant
who has been seen fleeing the scene of a mugging.41 A policeman
testifies to having found the reportedly stolen wallet in the defen-
dant's home. The defense explains that the accused was running for
a train and knew nothing of a stolen wallet in his home. In Zucker-
man's view, the prosecution banishes reasonable doubt when it shows
that no trains were running at that time and that the defendant
actually used the wallet.42 He concedes the possibility that the
accused erroneously believed there was a train at the time, and used
the wallet without realizing it was not his, but dismisses such an
explanation as having "no perceptible probability."43
Here Newman's distinction between that level of assurance which
is so great that nothing can make one more sure-certitude, by his
definition-and lesser levels of assurance becomes illuminative. One
can imagine that the juror in Zuckerman's hypothetical, consistent
with her vote of guilty, would feel more at ease if the prosecution
presented additional evidence, such as information that the defendant,
so far from being absent-minded, was renowned among friends for
meticulous attention to small details. If the addition of more evidence
could strengthen a juror's assurance, that juror's original doubt was
perceptible but not reasonable. Though Newman and Zuckerman
actually share the view that certitude does not admit of degree,
38. Id. at 135.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 134.
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Newman's clear definition of certitude helps illuminate the flaw in
Zuckerman's elucidation of "beyond reasonable doubt." Doubt may
be perceptible but not reasonable.
Newman and Zuckerman face the same difficulty. They both imply
that a juror who could be made any more sure of guilt should not
vote for conviction. This view is not only intuitively difficult to
accept, it is contradicted by the legal case which Newman relied upon
as an example. The case depended solely upon circumstantial
evidence against the defendant and did not "directly prove the actual
crime."'  Counsel for the defense had suggested to the jury mem-
bers that they could not find his client guilty "unless they were as
much satisfied that the prisoner did the deed as if they had seen him
commit it."45 The judge disagreed. "'That is not the certainty ...
which is required of you to discharge your duty to the prisoner ....
[but rather] that degree of certainty... with which you decide upon
and conclude your own most important transactions in life."'46
Newman seems half-aware of the difficulty posed to his argument
by the judge's explicit reference to "degree of certainty." His
explanation is that the judge was referring to "degrees of proof, or
approximations towards proof, and not certitude, as a state of
mind."47  By Newman's own account, though, the rejected jury
instruction referred not to degrees of proof but to the jury's state of
mind: "[T]he [j]ury could not pronounce a verdict of guilty unless they
were as much satisfied that the prisoner did the deed as if they had
seen him do it."'4 8 If, as Newman contends, a mind which feels
certitude cannot feel any greater assurance, why did the judge correct
the counsel? Newman's view that there could be no degrees of
certitude should have led him to commend the defense counsel's
suggestion to the jury, for it was the counsel's advice to the jury, and
not that of the judge, which perfectly matched Newman's example of
the person who could not be made more certain of India's existence
by going to India. Both the defense counsel and Newman were
saying that certitude is certitude; if any evidence could possibly make
one feel more confident of a proposition's truth, one lacks certitude.
The court disagreed.
The question of whether legal or religious certitude admits of
degree exemplifies the way Newman and the law illuminate one
another. Both Newman's concept of certitude and Zuckerman's
44. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 211 (quotation not cited in original).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 210.
48. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8: 63
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol8/iss1/4
Moran
elucidation of "beyond reasonable doubt" share a common ambiguity
as to the degree of assurance which accompanies conclusions of fact.
Newman's subjective but strict definition of certitude-the evidence
threshold varies from person to person but it must so convince the
fact-finder that she cannot be made more sure-leads to the insight
that a juror's exclusion of "reasonable doubt" need not be the highest
attainable state of assurance.
That clarification, ironically, ricochets to undermine both academic
descriptions of the "reasonable doubt" standard and Newman's
definition of certitude. Since certainty in the law is something less
than a conclusion of which one cannot be made more sure, it
resembles an acting assumption rather than Newman's certitude. I
argued earlier that Newman's strict definition of certitude papered
over an ambivalence as to whether religious faith resembled practical
certainty or an assurance of which one could not be made more sure.
His own analogy to the certainty required of a jury for a guilty verdit
serves to emphasize this fracture in his thinking. The practical
certainty required of juries illustrates the fact that people make life
and death decisions on the basis of something less than absolute
certainty as he defined it. This observation does not destroy
Newman's case for the reasonableness of religious certitude. It does
demonstrate, however, that Newman overstated the equation between
religious certitude, as he understood it, and other forms of certainty.
B. Newman's Model of Human Reasoning Suggests Original
Explanations to Two Questions About the Process of Jury
Fact-Finding
In this subsection I employ Newman's understanding of reason and
certitude to answer two questions about the process of reasoning by
which a jury reaches conclusions of fact. The first question arises
from Newman's emphasis on the role of morality in the reasoning
process. Does a juror only analyze evidentiary probabilities or does
she also make moral judgments that require some guidance from
conscience? I argue that she legitimately makes moral judgments.
Second, since a judge is expected to justify the legal basis for a ruling
of law, why does a jury not articulate the evidentiary basis for a
conclusion of fact? Newman's model explains that the mental process
of arriving at decisions of fact is more difficult to render in words
than the mental process of arriving at decisions of law.
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1. Newman's View That the Level of Proof Necessary for Certitude
Is Subjective to Each Person Suggests an Explanation for the
Meaning of the Term "Moral Certainty"
While courts have long used the term "moral certainty" to
elaborate the criminal trial standard of proof,49 the practice has
drawn severe criticism over the past two decades. Justice Stanley
Mosk of the California Supreme Court attacked jury instructions that
equated the term "moral certainty" with "beyond reasonable doubt"
because he thought the phrase would confuse jurors.50  "I'd like to
hear someone attempt to tell ... [us]," he challenged, "what 'moral
certainty' is."'" Objections to the term even reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska.52 While the Court refused to
find use of the term in jury instructions unconstitutional,53 it
expressed concern that the phrase might encourage jurors to apply "a
standard of proof lower than due process requires" and to allow
"convictions on factors other than the government's proof., 54 Justice
Blackmun, concurring and dissenting, warned that the term would
lead jurors to convict "based in part on value judgments ... par-
ticularly where the defendant is alleged to have committed a
repugnant or brutal crime., 5
In the previous Section, I argued that the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard should not be interpreted to mean a degree of juror
assurance which could not be increased. That description places the
threshold too high. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that "grave uncertainty" or "substantial doubt" are terms that
would encourage a juror to place the standard of proof un-
constitutionally low. 56 In between those general boundaries, a juror,
like Newman's religious believer, must define the threshold of
certainty for herself. The more accurate way of understanding
reasonable doubt, therefore, is not as an objective threshold of proof
but as the level of probability which each juror deems sufficient to
49. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 570 (1914) (approving reasonable doubt
instruction defined through reference to moral certainty); Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler,
185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902) (holding that "[p]roof to a 'moral certainty' is an equivalent phrase with
'beyond reasonable doubt"').
50. People v. Brigham, 599 P.2d 100,107-21 (1979) (Mosk, J., concurring), quoted in Shapiro,
supra note 25, at 153-54.
51. SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 6, 1988, at 9, quoted in Shapiro, supra note 25, at 154.
52. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
53. But cf Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39,41 (1990) (holding that jury instructions requiring
"grave uncertainty" and "substantial doubt" for conviction, in conjunction with term "moral
certainty," violated Due Process Clause).
54. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1248.
55. Id. at 1258 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
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vote for conviction. In the following discussion, I argue that
conscience, rather than reason, is what a juror necessarily uses to
determine that threshold. Conviction "beyond a reasonable doubt"
is, in this sense, a "moral certainty."
This understanding of "moral certainty" implies a threshold of
proof no different than that traditionally required in criminal cases.
Yet the meaning I ascribe to the term seems to epitomize Justice
Blackmun's fear that the term encourages jurors to base convictions
"in part on value judgments."57 Unlike Justice Blackmun, however,
I do not view such value judgments as always illegitimate. They are,
in all events, inevitable.
The term "moral certainty" echoes the concept of legal proof used
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when there was less
concern with rationality and impartiality and more reliance on jurors'
pre-existing knowledge of events.58 The jury as an institution arose
in communities where crimes requiring juries were few and in which
many of the details of the case were already known to members of
the jury before the trial.59 While methods of utilizing individual
jurors' knowledge of the case varied, it was generally accepted that
such knowledge could be introduced into deliberations. Even in the
seventeenth century, courts had not fully implemented the modern
rule that a juror must consider only information submitted in court.
In 1650 an English judge ruled that a juror could present evidence to
the court, so long as he was heard under oath,' and as late as 1670
a judge ruled that jurors could deliberate and vote based on their own
knowledge of the case as well as evidence presented at trial.6'
This greater role for an individual juror's knowledge coincided with
a greater role for the individual juror's conscience. Jury instructions
suggested that it was the juror's responsibility not only to evaluate
evidence in terms of its accuracy, but to see that justice be done in
some larger sense. The juror was often instructed to convict only if
she was "satisfied in [her]... particular Understanding and
Conscience" of the "truth and Righteousness of ... [the] verdict."'62
57. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1258 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. In Victor, the Court noted a point already made in this Article, that the term "moral
certainty" originally described the type of conclusion based on probability, as contrasted with
a conclusion of absolute certainty. Id. at 1246; see also supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
This is certainly one aspect of the history of the standard of proof, but it omits those aspects of
the term's history which I emphasize here.
59. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 163 n.23.
60. Benett v. Hartford, 82 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1650), quoted in Shapiro, supra note 25, at
163 n.23.
61. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1013 (C.P. 1670), quoted in Shapiro, supra note 25,
at 163 n.23.
62. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 165.
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One court instructed jurors to convict only upon a "fully satisfied
conscience"; another "according to their Conscience and the best of
their Judgment."'63
It might be argued that conscience, in this context, has nothing to
do with questions of fact: Whether the accused in fact committed the
crime is different from whether the accused ought to be convicted for
it. However, the line between fact and justice is not clear. A juror
who feels no sympathy for a defendant may still have difficulty
deciding whether her doubts are reasonable or unreasonable. A
juror's intellect can analyze the evidence and make the informal
probability judgments which permit her to estimate where she is in
relation to absolute certainty. Her intellect cannot tell her, though,
how close she must be in order to vote for conviction. Within the
rough and imprecise bounds set by the jury instructions, that accom-
modation will arise out of the juror's subjective understanding of
justice.
To pose as blunt an example as possible, suppose a juror, who
defines "beyond reasonable doubt" as "a percentage in the upper
nineties" sits consecutively in two trials. The defendant in the first
trial has stolen the proverbial loaf of bread to feed her family and the
juror crudely estimates a 98% chance of guilt. The defendant in the
second trial is accused of rape and the judge has admitted evidence
that the defendant has a history of similar violent assaults. The juror
just as crudely estimates this defendant to be 95% guilty. In deciding
both cases, she has to weigh the danger of unjust conviction against
the value to society of convicting a criminal. If she were a pure
rationalist, she might avoid this balancing process by imposing the
same probability threshold on both defendants. However, even a
commonly applied threshold would represent a balancing of those two
values. Moreover, because no jury instructions require a juror to
apply the same probability threshold to all cases, her decision to
impose the same probability threshold is itself a value judgment she
has introduced into the criteria for conviction. This judgment can
come from nowhere else but her "faculty of ... apprehending the
difference between right and wrong. '
The word "moral," strictly defined, is used to distinguish "between
right and wrong ... in relation to the actions ... of responsible
beings., 65 Where the action in question involves branding a person
a criminal, the old instructions to convict only with a "satisfied
conscience" may have been more candid than the term "reasonable
63. Id.
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doubt." To suggest that excluding reasonable doubt is a purely
epistemic matter is to forget that each juror must choose her own
threshold of proof and that this choice is necessarily a moral one.
Our legal system's present use of the term "moral certainty" may
be just an archaic way of saying that a jury need not have absolute
certainty to convict. Yet if that were the only purpose of the term,
courts could easily have adopted a more value-neutral phrase, such as
"practical certainty," to express the same concept. Even if "moral
certainty" is the muted descendant of the "satisfied conscience"
standard, modem courts obviously will not make the connection
explicit for fear of encouraging jurors to draw inappropriately on
private moral judgments to alter the standard of proof. Nevertheless,
the juror's "satisfied conscience" continues to be a threshold for
conviction. While the intellect may scale the continuum towards
certainty, only conscience can tell the mind it has reached its
provisional plateau-moral certainty. Authorities who seek to discard
"moral certainty," such as Justices Blackmun and Mosk, may disguise
this aspect of the judicial fact-finding process. They cannot change it.
2. Newman's Distinction Between Formal and Informal Inference
Suggests an Original Explanation for the Distinction Between
Questions of Law for the Judge and Questions of Fact for the
Jury
Generally speaking, a judge's role in a criminal trial is to decide
questions of law; questions of fact are reserved for the jury.' A
judge normally justifies her judgment with a written opinion, whereas
juries present bare verdicts. An appeals court may review a judge's
ruling, point to errors in her reasoning, and overrule the decision.
But a jury's conclusions of fact are generally not reviewable. Why
would a rational process of guilt determination not require juries, like
judges, to state the grounds of decision?
A host of practical administrative considerations suggest that such
a requirement would be prohibitively inconvenient. But Newman's
model of the human reasoning process provides a compelling
explanation of why juries ought not be required to state the grounds
of decision, even absent the administrative inconvenience.
Recall Newman's distinction between formal inference and informal
inference.67 By formal inference, Newman referred to reasoning
66. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1895). For instance, in the trial of an accused
murderer who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, the judge will determine jury instructions
which represent relevant law on the insanity defense. The jury then evaluates the evidence and
applies the abstract instruction to the particular defendant on trial.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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which could be put into words. The more words are made precise
and exact, "the less they have to do with . . . concrete reality.
68
Formal inference, Newman observed, requires universal propositions
and "comes short of ... concrete issues., 69 It achieves precision at
the expense of concreteness. The informal inferences that are
necessary to apply any general proposition to a particular object are
more difficult to express in words. Newman noted that informal
inference
does not supersede the logical form of inference, but is one and
the same with it; only it is no longer an abstraction, but.carried
out into the realities of life, its premises being instinct with the
substance and the momentum of that mass of probabilities,
which, acting upon each other in correction and confirmation,
carry it home definitely to the individual case.7"
The means by which a judge and a jury collaborate to produce a
verdict in a criminal trial constitute a rough institutional expression of
the distinction between formal and informal inferences. The judge
decides abstract questions of law, and must be ready to support his
conclusions with formal inferential reasoning. By Newman's
understanding of reason, the general and abstract character of
decisions of law makes them acts of formal inference. Written
justifications of formal inferences are appropriate, since their
abstractness renders them easily articulable. By contrast the jury
resolves questions of concrete fact and need never justify the
inferential steps which lead to its decision. Newman's model of
human reasoning suggests that this absence of explanation for a jury
verdict is appropriate to the type of reasoning involved. Resolution
of questions of fact requires informal inferences which are difficult to
render in words.
C. Newman's Account of the Evidence Necessary for Certitude
Finds Only Qualified Support in Analogy to the Law
In Newman's mind, the central challenge to the argument that faith
is consistent with reason is the believer's inability to adduce evidence
equal to her certitude in Christian dogma. At the heart of Grammar
of Assent, therefore, is the argument that one may believe a
proposition even if one cannot prove it. This argument creates a
variety of difficulties. Sir Anthony Kenny poses one of them: Can
absolute certitude of a proposition's truth rest upon an accumulation
68. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 185.
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id at 190 (emphasis added).
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of evidentiary judgments, when each of those judgments, viewed in
isolation, leaves room for doubt?71 Put more succinctly, can any
conclusion be stronger than its weakest link? A second question is
similar to the first, but more difficult for Newman's argument. How
can Newman be certain of religious faith while acknowledging that the
sum of the evidence is imperfect? As the previous subsection used
Newman's description of reason and certitude to answer questions
about law, this subsection uses the law to address these two questions
about Newman's description of reason and certitude.
1. Analogy to the Rules of Criminal Evidence Supports Newman's
View That an Accumulation of Individual Bits of Evidence,
Each Inconclusive in Isolation, May Provide a Reasonable
Ground for Certitude
Rejecting systematic logical deduction as a basis for religious faith,
Newman relied upon a web of interrelated probabilistic judgments to
support certitude. Thus his metaphor, "I liken [certitude] to the
mechanism of some triumph of skill, where all display is carefully
avoided, and the weight is ingeniously thrown in a variety of direc-
tions, upon supports which are distinct from, or independent of each
other."72 Sir Anthony Kenny finds fault with this approach on the
ground that no conclusion can ever be more certain than the most
reliable piece of evidence supporting it.73 In Kenny's view, Newman
fails to understand that "evidence has to be better known than that
for which it is evidence., 74
Kenny's argument neglects the significance of corroboration. An
unreliable piece of evidence may fit into a larger assemblage of bits
of evidence, each of which is similarly unreliable. Yet all of them
together may corroborate each other and the central proposition, thus
contributing to a conclusion that is more probable than any individual
piece of evidence supporting it.
For example, imagine that ten witnesses all claim to have seen a
defendant at different times on the night of a murder. Each reports
seeing him perform some activity which, if true, enhances the
probability of his guilt. Suppose further that the case is sensational
and that the jury members suspect that up to three of the witnesses
are fabricating their stories to become talk-show guests. The jury also
concludes that the testimony of any seven of the witnesses suffices to
71. Anthony Kenny, Newman as a Philosopher of Religion, in NEWMAN: A MAN FOR OUR
TIME 99, 118 (David Brown ed., 1990).
72. 19 LETrERS AND DIARIES, supra note 6, at 460.
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exclude reasonable doubt. In this situation, the accumulation of
witnesses' testimony convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, though the jurors may harbor a reasonable
doubt as to the credibility of each of the witnesses.
In a slightly different context, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
rejected an implication that evidence has to be better known than that
for which it is evidence. In United States v. Bourjaily,7 5 the Court
admitted out-of-court statements into evidence as testimony. It
indicated that while out-of-court statements were generally not
admissible, a judge could admit such evidence if there was proof of a
conspiracy between the accused and the person whose testimony was
in question.
[O]ut-of-court statements are only presumed unreliable. The
presumption may be rebutted by appropriate proof..
[Ijndividual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove
a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an evidentiary
presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts.
Taken together, these two propositions demonstrate that a piece
of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative
when corroborated by other evidence.6
To the extent that the U.S. Supreme Court's position accurately
represents common-law rules of evidence in general, those rules
defend Newman's view that one may hold a conclusion with greater
assurance than any individual probabilistic judgment supporting it.
2. Newman's Insistence That One's Assurance May Exceed the
Sum of Supporting Evidence Seems to Distinguish Religious
Belief from Non-Religious Forms of Belief
The more difficult question Newman's argument raises is whether
one's assurance can exceed the sum of the evidence, viewed as a cor-
roborative whole. One of Newman's more sympathetic critics, Basil
Mitchell, made this argument against Newman: While informal
accumulations of evidence may amount to certainty on some
questions, the argument for the truth of Christian dogma clearly does
not.77 According to Mitchell, Newman responds to this charge by
"conced[ing] the inadequacy of argument for Christian belief in so far
as it is based on 'the evidence,' but insisting that any such argument
is inevitably incomplete, because no account has been taken of the
75. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
76. Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
77. Basil Mitchell, Newman as a Philosopher, in NEWMAN AFTER A HUNDRED YEARS 222
(Ian Ker & Alan G. Hill eds., 1990).
[Vol. 8: 63
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol8/iss1/4
Moran
antecedent assumptions which the particular reasoner brings to the
evidence.,18
Mitchell is right to emphasize the importance of antecedent
assumptions to Newman's argument. Newman is at his most original
in demonstrating that if people differ in first (antecedent) principles,
then (a) they will attach different probabilities to the same evidence,
and (b) logic alone will not reconcile their views. Whether there is
enough evidence to justify religious certitude is, therefore, an ines-
capably relative question. Those who share Newman's set of an-
tecedent assumptions and principles will view the articulable evidence
as establishing a higher probability case for Christian dogma than
those who do not. Mitchell then goes on to explore the difficulties
with Newman's assumption that his first principles are true.
Mitchell glosses over, however, the evidentiary deficit which
Newman faces whether or not he successfully establishes his first
principles. Many who accept the creed of the Roman Catholic
Church share Newman's antecedent principles,79 but do not find his
evidence sufficient to approximate the probability of other clear
truths, e.g., the existence of India. Newman himself did not seem to
think that his statable evidence was that strong either. He had much
to say about the way in which evidence could mount so high as to be
indistinguishable from certitude. The process was like "the running
into a limit, in the case of mathematical ratios. 80 With regard to the
evidence he could adduce for his own religious belief, however, he
cautioned that no one should "claim for his conclusions an acceptance
or a scientific approval which is not to be found anywhere, but [can
do no more than state] what are personally his own grounds for his
belief in Natural and Revealed Religion.""
Contrary to Mitchell's representation, Newman did not necessarily
think Christian belief lacked sufficient evidence. Rather he thought
that the evidence was not always articulable. s  In all modes of
78. Id. at 229.
79. To discuss the possibility of someone sharing Newman's antecedent principles raises a
difficult question about his argument. Since Newman thought that a person's first principles
arose from her unique personality, he might have been tempted to deny the possibility that any
two people can start from the same set of first principles. But that would push his argument into
a tautology, since it would permit any difference of conclusion to be explained as a difference
in first principles. The better interpretation of his argument, which I have employed in the text,
is that people of like religious outlook could agree upon a common set of premises for purposes
of religious inquiry.
80. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 210.
81. Id. at 249.
82. Newman did, in fact, declare that the tenants of Christianity had to adduce evidence like
any other proposition, but he added that he "would only maintain that the proof need not be
the subject of analysis, or take a methodical form, or be complete and symmetrical."
UNIVERSITY SERMONS, supra note 1, at 199-200.
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human inquiry, he argued, men act on evidence which they cannot put
into words, of which they may not even be aware. He supplies a
variety of examples to support this view, such as the person who
observes a familial resemblance between family members but cannot
specify which facial features are similar,83 and Napoleon's ability to
view a battlefield and know immediately the manner in which enemy
troops would be arranged.'
A hypothetical example makes Newman's point clearly. Imagine
that it is useful to the owners of a poultry farm to identify chick
gender immediately after the chick emerges from the egg. The indicia
of gender are extremely difficult to identify in chicks so young.
Nonetheless, it turns out that some people can look at chicks and
reliably determine gender. If asked to specify the characteristics used
to make the judgment, they cannot explain. They simply realize the
truth of the matter, and cannot adequately articulate the means by
which they arrive at it.
Here, Newman might say, is a perfect example of the mental
pattern which corresponds to religious belief. The inner assurance of
God cannot be put into words and leaves the believer in no doubt as
to the truth of Christian dogma. If pressed, this person can point to
evidence, as Newman does in the last chapter of the Grammar of
Assent. But this stated evidence will express only a portion of the
evidence that is present in the experience of the believer. The
devout person, like the chick gender selectors, believes without the
ability to state the full grounds for belief. "Every man has a reason,"
Newman wrote, "but not every man can give a reason."85
There is an important difference, however, between the case of the
chick gender selector and that of the religious believer, a difference
which Newman never acknowledges. The inarticulable judgment of
a particular chick gender selector is only credited when subsequent
events reveal that this particular person's inarticulable judgments are,
in fact, reliable. Likewise, we would trust Napoleon's snap judgments
as to troop placements because he generally went on to win the
battle. On the other hand, we would not be reasonable to continue
trusting a person's ability to see family resemblances if the person
repeatedly proved incorrect. When a person cannot articulate a
reason for his conclusion, placing confidence in his conclusion is not
necessarily reasonable. The reasonableness of the confidence does
83. GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, supra note 2, at 190.
84. Id. at 216.
85. UNIVERSITY SERMONS, supra note 1, at 259.
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depend upon evidence, even if the evidence is demonstrably reliable
judgment rather than articulated reasons.8 6
Newman wishes to maintain that the intellectual process that leads
to religious belief is no different in kind from that which leads to
conviction in non-religious matters. Yet nearly all the secular
certitudes that Newman cites share the quality of ex post verifiability.
It is difficult to imagine an ex post means of verifying the reliability
of judgment in Christian dogma. Certainly Newman does not
articulate any way of verifying religious judgment.
What, however, of the parallel between the evidentiary basis for
religious belief and the evidentiary basis for jury verdicts? As noted
earlier, Newman's concept of informal inference offers a compelling
explanation for the fact that juries render verdicts but not
explanations. 7 Both the juror who votes to convict and the religious
believer arrive at a conclusion of fact through the exercise of informal
inference. Neither can articulate all the evidence for her conclusion.
More importantly, in light of the criterion of ex post verifiability, no
clear evidence demonstrates that jurors' judgments are sound. For
instance, no test has ever shown that juries convict only guilty
defendants, or do so within an acceptable margin of error. In this
sense, to the extent that the legal system trusts jury verdicts, it does
so in the same way that Newman trusts his religious
judgment-without ex post verification of the judgment's accuracy.
To elaborate this point, consider a defense counsel lawyer debating
one of the twelve jurors who has just voted to convict his client. A
proponent of strictly defined rationality would expect the juror, by
herself, to make a stronger argument for guilt than the defense
attorney's argument for innocence. If one favors Newman's account
of rationality, however, one might continue to believe in the jury
verdict even if the defense counsel made out a stronger case. One's
confidence in the verdict depends upon the soundness of the juror's
judgment as much as the juror's ability to articulate reasons for the
decision.
The difference between Newman's religious certitude and the
conclusion of the jury, however, is that we have experience in
everyday life with citizens who sit on juries. That experience tends to
show that they have a certain limited competence in matters of factual
inquiry. We apportion our confidence in jury verdicts in relation to
our general sense that citizens are competent and responsible in the
86. I am indebted to Mr. Adrian A. S. Zuckerman of University College, Oxford, for the
example of the chick gender selectors and for the insight that Newman's account of judgment
evades the question of verifiability.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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matters of factual inquiry similar to those facing a jury. A person's
level of confidence in the accuracy of jury verdicts is only reasonable
if it is so apportioned. But Newman offers no comparable way in
which religious believers apportion their confidence in religious
judgment to its proven ability at reaching right results.
In sum, the fact that jury verdicts, like other non-religious factual
conclusions, are accepted without justification offers only qualified
confirmation of Newman's view that a rational person's degree of
assurance can exceed articulated evidence. It is true that judgment,
as well as articulable evidence, can provide a sound basis for certainty.
However, judgment normally must prove its reliability in reaching
correct conclusions. In trusting his religious judgment absolutely,
Newman faced the same problem that he confronted in insisting that
certitude would not admit of degree."8 His description of religious
certitude distinguishes it from, rather than identifies it with, certitude
in secular matters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though Newman possessed a profoundly original mind, he was not
a systematic thinker. Both this strength and this weakness are evident
in Grammar of Assent. The central purpose of his book was to
identify characteristics of human reason that were common to both
religious belief and belief in non-religious matters. Analogy to jury
verdicts confirms part of his argument. In particular it defends
Newman's argument from those who, with Sir Anthony Kenny,
believe that "evidence has to be better known than that for which it
is evidence."8 9
Yet Newman clearly overstated the similarity between religious
belief and non-religious belief. His effort to equate religious
certitude, which does not admit of degree, with jury verdicts, which
clearly do, was unsuccessful. More importantly, he failed to provide
any ex post means of verifying religious judgment.
This raises the question of whether Newman's failure to provide an
ex post means of verifying religious judgment necessarily disables his
argument that religious belief is as reasonable as any non-religious
belief. I think that it does not. A rescue of Newman's case would
begin by identifying a subject in which conclusions are reasonable
though the judgment which produces them is not demonstrably
reliable. Morality provides the most obvious supporting example for
this point. If a person derives pleasure from being cruel to others and
88. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
89. Kenny, supra note 71, at 118.
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values only evidence and reason, not kindness or selflessness, no
argument will dissuade her from further cruelty. Anyone who wishes
to maintain a moral belief with certitude relies not solely upon
evidence but on some inner sense, the veracity of which is discerned
in one's conscience rather than formally proved. To justify moral
beliefs, it might be argued, scientific or legal standards of reason and
evidence are inadequate. The same is true, Newman might argue, in
the case of religious belief.'
This approach, of course, raises a whole new set of problems, too
extensive to be treated in this Article. My purpose here is simply to
suggest that Newman's failure to identify a strict conformity between
reason in religious matters and reason generally, does not necessarily
defeat his argument. He might have salvaged it simply by narrowing
his model of reason to include only those types of certitude that
resemble religious belief most closely, such as moral belief.
Yet Newman's efforts to identify the similarities between religious
and secular certitudes is precisely what produced his piercing
psychological and analytical insights into reason in secular matters.
His strict definition of certitude as something of which one cannot be
more sure clarifies the concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt." That
clarification, together with his original explanation of morality's role
in the reasoning process, suggests that conscience, as well as eviden-
tiary analysis, is necessary to achieve "moral certainty." And his
distinction between formal and informal inference explains why a jury
might not be able to offer a written justification for a reasonable
verdict.
In sum, analogy to jury verdicts demonstrates that Newman's model
was not the general description of human reasoning that he believed
it to be. It was, however, his effort to describe reason generally, to
identify connections between reason in religion and reason in secular
matters, that makes his work so fertile a source of insight into jury
verdicts.
90. For an elaboration on this approach, see CAMERON, supra note. 13, at 216.
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